This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime. We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents. In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. H o wever, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we s h o w that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.
Introduction
The economic analysis of crime has its starting point with Becker's (1968) seminal work: individuals rationally decide whether to engage in criminal activities by comparing the expected returns to crime with the returns to legitimate business. Hence, crime is less attractive if the government increases the probability (certainty) and severity of punishment. Alternatively, b y increasing market opportunities, one makes crime less attractive. Becker's main thesis is that since imposing a ne is costless, this ne should equal an individual's entire wealth and be complemented by a probability of punishment to optimally deter crime.
Most of the literature on crime has focused on the role of deterrence as pointed out in a recent survey by Garoupa (1997) . The discussion has been around alternative c haracterizations of optimal penalties and enforcement strategies in the context of partial equilibrium where the normative criteria is to minimize a given welfare function that measures the social loss resulting from crime. 1 This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime. The term`organized crime' has been used with various meaning by scholars and prosecutors in di erent c o u n tries. Some authors use it to de ne a set of relations among illegal organizations, while others use it to indicate a group of illegal activities performed by a g i v en set of agents. Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) summarize the following characteristics of organized crime: (i) economies of scale and exploitation of monopolistic prices on the supply of illegal goods and services, (ii) practice of violence against other legal and illegal business, (iii) criminal hierarchy w i t h i n ternalization of negative externalities and management of portfolio of risky activities, (iv) avoidance of resource dissipation through competitive l o b b ying and corruption, (v) easier access to markets.
The distinction between the two main roles of the criminal organization -a s g o vernment and as a rm -is especially fruitful when applied to the analysis of policy-making. In this respect, we h a ve to distinguish between three main areas of deterrence policies against organized crime: rst, the traditional deterrence strategies based on investment i n i n vestigate activities and in the judicial and penitential systems in order to increase the probability of detection of crimes related to the criminal organizations' activities second, the deterrence strategies related to the regulatory activities of the government third, the deterrence policies against money laundering and the investment of illegal pro ts in legal activities.
Economic analysis of organized crime has stressed welfare comparisons between monopoly and competitive supply of bads as in Buchanan (1973) and Backhaus (1979) . In a recent p a p e r , D i c k (1995) develops an analytical framework in which transaction costs, rather than monopoly power, primarily determine the activities of organized criminal rms. The paper predicts that organized crime is more successful when there is production cost advantage. Grossman (1995) has developed an alternative analysis: the Ma a is modeled as a competitor to the state in the provision of public services. In this literature, the e ect of competition between the Ma a and the state on the allocation of resources and the distribution of income is analyzed. The model implies that, as long as taxation allows, competition between the Ma a and the state increases the provision of public services and, thereby, also increases the net income of the representative producer. Accordingly, the representative producer should support the continued existence of the Ma a. The Ma a exists as an alternative provider of production services to the private sector and competes with the government in terms of tax rates and provision of production services, its existence can have a bene cial e ect because it moderates the kleptocratic tendencies of the government.
The current theory of optimal law enforcement might be helpful to discuss law enforcement policy in presence of organized crime. However, as we s h o w in the paper, the current theory misses one of the most important characteristics of the market for crime when there is a dominant rm which extracts surplus from smaller criminal rms. A criminal organization has a principal of a vertically integrated structure where agents are individual criminal rms. Following Jennings (1984) , Skaperdas (1994, 1997) , Polo (1995) , and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995), we consider the principal's necessity to discipline its members by i n troducing an incentive constraint. Depending on how accurate is the principal's set of information about the market, di erent policy rules are derived. Moreover, we s h o w t h a t it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.
Using the current t h e o r y
In this section, we summarize possible applications of results obtained in the economic theory of criminal law when the market for crime is competitive t o the case of a cartelized market.
(1) Wealth
The starting point i s B e c ker's (1968) theory described before. One corolary of this thesis is that severity of punishment increases with wealth. As a consequence, one could argue that punishment should be more severe in presence of organized crime because members of a Ma a are usually wealthy, or wealthier than petty crooks. This observation can be counter-argued by Polinsky and Shavell (1991) thesis that above a certain level of wealth, all individuals should face the same punishment because that will be enough to optimally deter them given the appropriate probability of detection and punishment.
(2) Externality
It has been noted in the literature that expected punishment should increase with the harmfulness of the criminal act, as in Polinsky and Shavell (1992) . One can argue that organized crime is usually associated with more harmful crimes and so law enforcement policy should be tougher.
(3) Risk neutrality
As in the Arrow-Lind Theorem, we can say that when criminals are organized, they behave as risk neutral individuals even though they may b e risk averse individually. From Polinsky and Shavell (1979), we k n o w t h a t the maximal ne result does not apply when individuals are risk averse. As a consequence, in presence of organized crime, a harsher policy should be enforced because individuals behave a s i f t h e y w ere risk neutral.
(4) Avoiding detection Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) have s h o wn that punishment should be tougher on those who are more able at avoiding detection and punishment.
It is popular noted, as in Robinson (1994) , that criminal organizations are much better at avoiding detection than individual crooks. That author cites the US Department of Justice saying`the crooks keep so far ahead of us, we will never completely close the net'. This is a fourth argument for a tougher policy when in presence of organized crime.
(5) Corruption
It has been shown in the literature that corruption weakens criminal deterrence. As pointed out by Becker and Stigler (1974) and Bowles and Garoupa (1997) , in presence of corruption, the government m ust design different l a w enforcement policies, including being tougher on criminal o enses or punishing harshly corruption. It is much easier for a criminal organization to engage on corruption than individuals because of economies of scale and access to information. Thus, in presence of organized crime, not only criminal punishment, but detection and punishment of corruption should be tougher.
(6) Incapacitation and jail sentences Most of the optimal law enforcement literature considers the bene ts and costs of criminal deterrence. Alternatively, w e can consider criminal incapacitation as in Shavell (1987) . Those criminals who have higher probability of committing a criminal act again should face tougher jail sentences to free society from them. In other words, more dangerous criminals should face a more severe punishment to incapacitate them from repeating o enses. As noted by Robinson (1994) , criminal organizations welcome the most dangerous criminals in the world:`today's criminals make the Capone crowd and the old Ma a look like small time crooks'. Therefore, members of criminal organizations should face a more severe punishment because they signal their higher likelihood of repeating o enses.
These observations do not recognize the structural and institutional problems faced by a criminal organization. These problems emerge because a criminal organization is a vertical structure where there are information problems and incentives to extract rents. Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) consider the issue of credible threats and incentive e ects within a gang. They show that there is a reputation problem and emphasize the role of strategic up-front i n vestment. As long as threats are credible, contracts in the criminal world are self-enforced.
In this paper, we model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may o r m a y not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents. In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. H o wever, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is destruction in the market. As a consequence, it might be optimal to choose a less harsher law enforcement policy depending on the social cost of this destruction and violence.
An alternative w ay of looking at this result is to say that as long as transaction costs are irrelevant in the criminal world, law enforcement policy should be harsh. However, if transaction costs are high and have a social value, law enforcement policy should be designed taking them into account.
The paper goes as follows: in section 3, we discuss the basic model in section 4, we i n troduce a criminal organization where the principal has accurate information in section 5, we a l l o w for imperfect information. The main conclusions are pointed out in section 6.
Model with a competitive criminal market Small rms
We start by considering an economy where risk-neutral homogenous individuals can work in two di erent sectors: legal sector and illegal sector. As in Muller and Opp (1986) and Grossman (1991) , each individual has to allocate his working time l within these two sectors. The number of hours spent i n the illegal sector is nl. Accordingly, the number of hours spent in the legal sector is (1 ; n)l.
The working time l is private information of individuals. The government does not observe each individual's working time. Di erences on working time represent di erent preferences for leisure. These preferences are private information. The government knows that the working time l is distributed across the population according to a distribution q(l) with support 0 L ].
The legal sector pays w per hour. The illegal sector pays z(nl) p e r nl hours, where z 0 > 0 and z 00 < 0. The payo function z(:) exhibits decreasing returns to scale. In this economy, w orking in the illegal sector is punished with probability p. The punishment f o r w orking in the illegal sector is f z (nl), where f 1.
Each individual maximizes expected income: Solving this optimization problem, the optimal share of time spent i n t h e illegal sector is n (l pf w). Comparative static results are shown in Table 1 .
The optimal policy
Unlike the choice of n by individuals and the choice of f by the courts, the choice of p is a public choice made by the government. This variable is chosen to maximize a social objective function. We consider the usual utilitarian social welfare function 2 and we assume that W is strictly concave i n p in the nonnegative orthant s o that the second-order condition is always satis ed. Solving this optimization problem gives us the optimal law enforcement policy when the market for crime is perfectly competitive.
Model with organized crime and perfect discrimination
Let us now assume that in this economy there is a criminal organization which pro ts are provided by extortion of small competitive criminal rms. This criminal organization asks each individual in the market to pay y as a license to work in the illegal sector. As an enforcement m e c hanism, this criminal organization destroys the business of those who do not join the organization with probability r. The resources to produce r are invested upfront. The principal cannot be detected and punished, only each individual can be detected and punished. Each individual joining this criminal organization keeps his own business and pays a xed rent y. If an individual prefers a solo career, he faces a probability r of being destroyed by this organization. Let us assume that the organization is able to discriminate individuals in terms of working time: the extracted rent y can be conditional on l. As a consequence, the organization extracts all surplus by asking rV which is the maximum amount individuals are willing to pay. This criminal organization chooses r to maximize expected pro ts. The organization's per-capita expected pro ts are:
where C (r) is the cost of producing the probability r of destroying solo careers, such that C 0 > 0 a n d C 00 > 0. The rst-order condition of this problem is:
and the second-order is always satis ed. The optimal probability r decreases with p. The reason is that a tougher law enforcement policy implies that each small rm has less to contribute to the organization: the rent must decrease and, by consequence, the probability of destroying independent business should decrease.
Optimal policy
The social welfare from a social utilitarian point of view must take i n to account the criminal organization's expected pro ts. The social welfare functional to be maximized is now:
We h a ve s h o wn that in this case r decreases with the probability p. A ccordingly, this introduces an extra marginal gain in the rst-order conditions. When a criminal organization exists and is able to discriminate individuals, the law enforcement policy should be tougher. The only role of a principal with perfect information is to extract surplus from small rms with a transaction cost. Destruction of business does not actually occur because all criminals pay the rent. This transaction cost happens in the criminal world, between small crooks and a big criminal organisation. A social utilitarian government w orries about it and uses the probability of punishment p to control it. The optimal probability of destruction r (p f ) and the optimal rent y (p f ) are related by the rule that equals the ratio of marginal bene ts to the ratio of marginal costs:
;k r =k y = C 0 =(1 ; Q(k))
In general, the comparative static results are ambiguous. Suppose the government f o l l o ws a tougher law enforcement policy. E a c h small rm earns less, and so the number of individuals willing to pay a rent decreases, ceteris paribus. As in the case of perfect information, one could argue that the organization should decrease the rent, and by consequence the probability o f destroying independent business should decrease. When the organization has perfect information such rule guarantees that individuals will keep paying a r e n t. The only consequence is that the organization extracts a smaller surplus. When the organization has imperfect information, some individuals do not pay rent. The decision of paying rent depends on l which i s p r i v ate information and on y=r. Accordingly, to increase the number of individuals paying rent one should decrease y=r which implies that r should increase, ceteris paribus. This is the source of ambiguity in the comparative static results.
In summary, the e ect of the policy instruments in the probability r is ambiguous because there are two opposite arguments: (i) the probability r should go down when there is a tougher policy because the xed rent g o e s down, and so it is relatively more costly to enforce this arrangement because the extracted surplus is smaller (ii) the probability r should go up when there is a tougher policy because more individuals prefer not to pay r e n t, and so the enforcement of this arrangement needs to be tougher. It is no longer true that a tougher policy should be enforced when a organization with imperfect information exists. Two reasons for that: (i) it is no longer true that the probability r necessarily decreases with the policy instruments (ii) the number of individuals willing to pay a rent decreases with the policy instruments, ceteris paribus. As a consequence, a tougher policy leads to more individuals having their business destroyed, ceteris paribus.
When there is imperfect information, the transaction cost is larger because some business is actually destroyed. Furthermore, it is no longer clear if this transaction cost decreases with the policy instruments.
Conclusion
We h a ve modeled a criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion.
The main result of this paper is that it may be optimal to choose a less tough law enforcement policy when there is organized crime. This result is derived from the observation that vertical integration in the criminal world is enforced by destroying the business of those who do not comply with the norms. A tougher policy may induce more destruction: in a sense there is competition between the government and the criminal organization to decide who is tougher, who is more frightful. As a consequence, the loss in welfare can be large.
